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4 June 2007 1 Introduction
International outsourcing has become an increasingly common phenomenon
in advanced economies. Sinn (2004) reports that no fewer than 60% of Ger-
man small and medium enterprises (SMEs) have established plants outside
the old EU. He argues that outsourcing and o⁄shoring have gone too far.
Firms that relocate all or parts of their production in low-wage economies
have contributed to a rising pool of unemployed workers. Due to wage in-
￿ exibility, globalisation ￿creates unemployment instead of gains from trade￿
(Sinn, 2004, p. 117). The main losers are obviously the low-skilled manufac-
turing workers in advanced economies. What can be said about the winners?
In popular discussions many people would think that the winners of global-
isation are owners of ￿rms that outsource. This view however is implicitly
based on the assumption that either outsourcing does not involve a ￿xed
cost, or the outsourcing ￿rm is a monopolist. When outsourcing ￿rms have
rivals, and ￿xed costs of outsourcing are non-negligible, it is not clear that
the ￿rms always come out as winners.
In this paper, using a model of outsourcing by monopolistically com-
petitive ￿rms, we show that, even in the case of ￿ exible domestic wages,
international outsourcing (and/or re-location of plants to a low-wage econ-
omy) by home ￿rms may worsen the welfare of the home country and reduce
the pro￿ts of all ￿rms in the industry, even though it is individually rational
for each ￿rm to choose to outsource. If a social planner for the home country
can choose the extent of international outsourcing, his optimal choice will
not coincide with the equilibrium outcome under laissez-faire. A wage sub-
sidy may reduce the extent of outsourcing and improve welfare.This con￿rms
Sinn￿ s perception that ￿Wage subsidies make the state into a partner. They
do not establish minimum wage demands and create the very ￿ exibility in
wage setting that is required for reaping the gains from trade.￿(Sinn, 2004,
2p. 119)
When the wage in the Home country is rigid we show that outsourcing is
welfare-improving for the home country if and only if the sum of the ￿trade
creation￿e⁄ect and the ￿exploitation￿e⁄ect exceeds the ￿trade diversion￿
e⁄ect of the access to the low-wage labour in the foreign country.
We also extend the model to a two-period framework, where each domes-
tic ￿rm faces the choice between beginning outsourcing (or re-location) in
the ￿rst period, or in the second period. Delaying outsourcing can be gain-
ful because the ￿xed cost of outsourcing may fall over time. On the other
hand, delaying means the ￿rm￿ s variable production cost in period 1 will
be higher than that of rivals who are outsourcing. The equilibrium of this
two-period game may involve some ￿rms outsourcing in period 1, while oth-
ers will outsource in period 2, even though ex-ante they are identical ￿rms.
Under monopolistic competition with homogeneous costs, in equilibium, the
sum of discounted pro￿ts is identical for all ￿rms. Again, a social planner
for the home country may choose a di⁄erent speed of outsourcing than the
speed achieved by an industry under laissez-faire.
Before proceeding, we would like to make some remarks on the litera-
ture on international outsourcing. The impacts of outsourcing on wages and
pro￿ts have been subjected to empirical studies (Feenstra and Hanson, 1999,
Kimura, 2002, G￿rzig and Stephen, 2002, G￿rg and Hanley, 2004), as well as
theoretical analysis (see, for example, Glass and Sagi, 2001, Grossman and
Helpman, 2002, 2003, 2005, Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg, 2006a, 2006b,
Jones, 2004, Long, 2005, and a special issue of the International Review of
Economics and Finance, 2005). A related literature is the theory of frag-
mentation, see Jones and Kierzkowski (1990, 2001a, 2001b), Long, Riezman,
and Soubeyran, (2005).
32 The Model
2.1 The basic assumptions
This is basically a partial equilibrium model. We are concerned with inter-
national outsourcing decisions of ￿rms in an advanced economy (called the
Home country, or H), and their impact on wages, pro￿ts, consumers surplus,
and social welfare. We also want to ￿nd out if the gainers in H can com-
pensate the losers. The structure of the economy of H is simple. There are
two industries, producing two goods. The numeraire good is produced by
a perfectly competitive industry. The second good is a di⁄erentiated good,
which consists of many varieties. It is produced by an imperfectly com-
petitive industry consisting of a continuum of monopolistically-competitive
￿rms, indexed by z, where z 2 [0;1]. Each of these ￿rms produces a unique
variety.The varieties are imperfect substitutes. The price of a unit of variety
z is denoted by p(z):Each ￿rm has a constant marginal cost of production,
and has incurred a ￿xed cost (e.g., it bought the patent for the variety it
produces). We take the number of ￿rms as ￿xed, because we wish to focus
on the short run issues. (In this respect, we follow the approach of Obstfeld
and Rogo⁄, 1995).
The foreign country is a low-wage economy.. Any variety produced in
the foreign country is made possible only by a ￿rm in H that sets up a
factory abroad to take advantage of the low wage. Thus we do not treat the
two countries symmetrically, in contrast to the standard literature on trade
under monopolistic competition, as exempli￿ed by the work of Helpman and
Krugman (1985),Venables (1987), and others.
2.1.1 Consumers
Let c(z) be the quantity of variety z consumed by the representative con-










where ￿ > 1
For any given sub-utility level C ￿ 0, the consumer chooses the amounts c(z)





























We call P the price index for the di⁄erentiated good. It is the cost of
achieving one unit of sub-utility.The utility function of the representative
consumer is assumed to be quasi-linear: U = v(C) + X where X is her con-
sumption of the numeraire good. We assume that v(C) is a strictly concave
function, with v(0) = 0 and v0(0) > 0.
Suppose the consumer i has a budget Bi to be allocated between the two
goods. The optimal allocation is the solution of the utility-maximization
problem maxv(Ci)+Xi subject to PCi +Xi = Bi. For any given P < v0(0),




We assume that the budget Bi is big enough so that the solution is interior.
5We assume that there are two types of workers: skilled workers and un-
skilled workers.The population consists of a continuum of individuals, in-
dexed by i 2 [0;1]. This continuum is the union of two continuums, [0;n)
and [n;1] where n < 1 is the fraction of population that is unskilled. Skilled
workers work only in the numeraire good sector. They earn a ￿xed wage Ws
(for example, their marginal product is a constant). Unskilled workers work
only in the di⁄erentiated good sector. Their wage rate is denoted by W.
Each unskilled worker is willing to o⁄er L units of labour time, as long as the
wage rate W exceeds their reservation wage Wr = ￿. If W = ￿ then they are





We may interpret ￿ as the disutility of work. This labour supply behaviour
may be rationalized by postulating the following overall utility function of
the unskilled worker
b U(Cu;Xu;Lu) = v(Cu) + Xu ￿ ￿Lu where 0 ￿ Lu ￿ L
where L is his ￿xed endowment of labour.The total supply of unskilled labour
in this economy is then nL. The disposable income of an unskilled worker
that supplies Lu units of labour is Yu = WLu + Tu, where Tu is the real
transfer from the government. We assume that Yu > PC￿(P) so that all
individuals consume the same quantity of di⁄erentiated good.
The welfare of the unskilled worker is calculated as follows. Given P, his
demand for the di⁄erentiated good is C￿(P). The excess of Yu over PC￿(P)
is used to buy the numeraire good: Xu = Yu ￿ PC￿(P). His welfare level
is therefore c Uu = v(C￿(P)) + [Yu ￿ PC￿(P)] ￿ ￿Luwhere Lu = L as long as
W > ￿.
62.1.2 Firms
Let q(z) denote the output of ￿rm z. We de￿ne the aggregate output of the









where ￿ > 1








The ￿rm that produces variety z takes P and C￿(P) as given, and thus per-
ceives the following demand function q(z) = p(z)￿￿P ￿C￿(P) = p(z)￿￿P ￿v0￿1(P).The
perceived elasticity of demand for ￿rm z￿ s output is ￿. The perceived mar-
ginal revenue is p(z)(￿ ￿1)=￿. Suppose the ￿rm uses unskilled labour as the
only input, and each additional unit of output requires 1 unit of unskilled
labour. Then marginal cost is W. Equating MR to MC, the ￿rm sets its
price at b p(z) = ￿
￿￿1W ￿ ￿W where ￿ > 1.
The pro￿ts of ￿rms are redistributed to individuals who are their owners.
We denote by ￿ the aggregate pro￿t of the di⁄erentiated good sector. We
assume for simplicity that only skilled workers are owners of ￿rms. The
disposable income of the representative skilled worker is then Ys = WsLs +
(1￿n)￿+Ts and her welfare level is b Us = v(C￿(P))+[Ys ￿ PC￿(P)]￿￿sLs.
2.2 Equilibrium output and equilibrium pro￿t
In what follows, we assume that v(Ci) = 1
￿C￿
i where 0 < ￿ < 1:Then
Ci = v
0￿1(P) = P




The demand function for variety z is then q(z) = p(z)￿￿P ￿￿￿ ￿ q(p(z);P).
The ￿rm maximizes ￿(z) = (p(z) ￿ W)q(z).
7From the ￿rm￿ s ￿rst order condition, we obtain a useful relationship be-





















This implies that for a given b p(z), the higher is the industry price index P,
the higher is ￿rm z￿ s equilibrium pro￿t. When all ￿rms charge the same









1￿￿ where ￿ > 1 (4)
2.3 The closed economy: equilibrium and welfare
Suppose the supply of unskilled labour is ￿xed at nL. If the wage is ￿ exible,
the output of the di⁄erentiated-product sector is Q = C = nL and the




.Note that, in our model with no ￿xed cost,
output and price under monopolistic competition are identical to those under
perfect competition. The wage rate under monopolistic competition is lower
than under perfect competition. The equilibrium wage rate is




















The aggregate pro￿t of the di⁄erentiated good industry is ￿ = (P ￿W)Q





welfare in the closed economy is then













8The overall utility of the representative unskilled worker is









3 International outsourcing: the case of zero
￿xed cost of outsourcing
Now let us open the economy to trade. To focus on outsourcing, we assume
that the foreign country is a low-wage economy, with surplus labour available
at the wage W f < W. Assume residents of the low-wage economy consume
only the numeraire good. In this section, we assume that home ￿rms can
relocate their plants to the low-wage economy costlessly. The outputs of
re-located di⁄erentiated-good ￿rms are exported back to the Home country
(H), where they are sold at the price pf per unit, where pf = ￿W f.Let s be
the fraction of Home ￿rms that are relocated to the low-wage economy, and
let b qf be the equilibrium output of the representative re-located ￿rm. By
assumption, all the outputs are re-exported to Home. The value of exports
from the low-wage economy (Foreign) to Home is then spfb qf = s￿W fb qf. The
pro￿ts of the re-located ￿rms, s(￿ ￿ 1)W fb qf, are repatriated to Home. The
di⁄erence between the foreign country￿ s export revenue and the re-patriated
pro￿t is sW fb qf, which is used to buy the numeraire good from Home. The
current account of each country is therefore balanced. It is as if the relocated
￿rms themselves ship the quantity sW fb qf of the numeraire good to pay
labour in Foreign and ship their output back to H.
We now consider the simplest scenario, where outsourcing does not involve
any ￿xed cost. Under this scenario, all ￿rms would want to relocate, unless
the wage rate in home falls to W f.
93.1 Case 1: ￿ exible wage in the Home country
Assume W > W f ￿ ￿. All ￿rms would want to relocate to the low-wage
economy, unless the wage rate in H falls to W f. In this sub-section, we
assume that the threat of relocation and hence of unemployment in H is
su¢ cient to cause the wage rate in H to fall to W f. The price falls to
P f = ￿W f < ￿W = v0(Q). So output of the di⁄erentiated good expands




= P f. Of the total output e Q, the quantity Q
is produced in Home. The di⁄erence e Q ￿ Q is produced in the low-wage
country. Home￿ s social welfare is then ￿1 = v(e Q) ￿ W fLf ￿ ￿Q.
Proposition 1: If the wage rate in the Home country is ￿exible, outsourc-
ing will expand industry output, lower the price, and increase H￿ s aggregate
welfare.
Proof: From the strict concavity of the function v(Q),





e Q ￿ Q
i
De￿ne





e Q ￿ Q
i
> 0
The change in welfare is then
￿
1 ￿ ￿ = v(e Q) ￿ v(Q) ￿ W
fL
f =










R(e Q;Q) + (￿W
f)
h




f = R(e Q;Q) + (￿ ￿ 1)W
fL
f > 0
where R(e Q;Q) > 0 because of the strict concavity of v(Q).
Of course, home unskilled workers receive a lower wage income. Their
gains in consumer surplus may not be su¢ cient to o⁄set the fall in wage
income. But the gainers (the capitalists and the consumers) can compensate
the losers.
103.2 Case 2: wage rigidity in the Home country
Consider now the opposite extreme where unskilled wage is ￿xed at W >
W f. All workers in H will become unemployed, even though individually
each would be willing to work at any wage W ￿ ￿. All the di⁄erentiated
product ￿rms re-locate to the low-wage country, and since their prices are




= ￿W f. Firms
employ Lf units of foreign labour, where Lf = e Q. Who gain and who lose ?


















as ￿ > 1
Since the unskilled workers are now unemployed, they lose all their worker￿ s
surplus. The social welfare of the Home country under outsourcing is thus
￿
2 = CS + ￿ = v(e Q) ￿ W
fe L
f = v(e Q) ￿ W









The change in welfare is
￿
2 ￿ ￿ =
h































v(e Q) ￿ v(Q) ￿ ￿W
f
￿







+ (￿ ￿ 1)W
f
h
e Q ￿ Q
i
(5)
The ￿rst term, v(e Q) ￿ v(Q) ￿ ￿W f
￿
e Q ￿ Q
￿
, which is positive, may be
called the ￿trade creation￿e⁄ect of the access to low-wage foreign labour:
consumers in H buy more of the di⁄erentiated good, because the price is now
lower. This term is can be represented by the familiar Harberger triangle.
(See Figure 1.)The second term, W fQ￿￿Q, may called ￿trade diversion￿
11A: TRADE CREATION EFFECT
B: EXPLOITATION EFFECT
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FIGURE 1: Decomposition of gains and losses
P(Q)
e⁄ect: Home producers are diverted to the foreign labour market because
of the lower wage there. But from the point of view of Home￿ s welfare, the
true cost of H￿ s labour is only ￿ per unit, not the ￿xed wage W > W f.
The expression W fQ￿￿Q is positive if the reservation wage ￿ in H is lower
than the foreign wage W f. The third term, (￿ ￿ 1)W f
h
e Q ￿ Q
i
is called
the ￿exploitation￿e⁄ect: Foreign labour is paid W f but the price of what
they produce is ￿W f. The change in social welfare of the Home country is
therefore ambiguous; it is positive if the sum of the trade creation e⁄ect and
the exploitation e⁄ect exceeds the adverse trade diversion e⁄ect. A (overly)
su¢ cient condition for this is ￿ ￿ W f.
Proposition 2: If the wage rate in the home country does not fall to
the foreign level W f, unemployent will result, and the e⁄ect of outsourcing
on social welfare of the Home country is ambiguous, depending on whether
the sum of the ￿trade creation￿e⁄ect and the ￿exploitation￿e⁄ect dominates
12the ￿trade diversion￿e⁄ect.
Corollary 2: (Welfare-enhancing Wage Subsidies) Assume W f >
￿. To avoid the ￿trade diversion￿e⁄ect, the government of the Home country
can introduce a wage-subsidy scheme: for each unit of home labour employed,
the ￿rms need to pay only W f, and the government pays the di⁄erence,
W ￿ W f. In our model, this subsidy is non-distorting. Under this wage
subsidy scheme, social welfare is higher, because the ￿trade diversion￿e⁄ect
of outsourcing is avoided.
Example 3.1: outsourcing resulting in a decrease in welfare
Let ￿ = 1=3, and ￿ = 2.Then ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 1:5: Assume nL = 1=(2
p
2).
Then fullemployment output is Q = 1=(2
p
2), and thus P = 2 and W =
1.Assume wage rigidity: the home wage is ￿xed at W = 1 both before and
after outsourcing. The reservation wage in the Home country is ￿ = 0:1 and
foreign wage is W f = 0:9: The price levels before and after outsourcing are
P = ￿W = 2 and P f = ￿W f = 1:8 respectively. Since Q = v0￿1(P) = P
1
￿￿1;
we have Q = (2)￿1:5 and e Q = (1:8)￿1:5: The change in welfare, from equation
(5), is ￿2 ￿ ￿ = ￿0:22257 < 0.The ￿trade diversion￿e⁄ect in this example
dominates the sum of the ￿trade creation￿e⁄ect and the ￿exploitation￿e⁄ect.
As the result, the net change in welfare is negative, i.e., a welfare reduction.
The intuition is clear: when the foreign wage falls bellow the home wage,
all ￿rms have the incentive to outsource in order to maximize their pro￿ts.
However, if the wage di⁄erence between the foreign country and home country
is small, and the reservation wage at home is low, the social welfare will fall.
This is because the increase in ￿rm￿ s pro￿ts and the increase in consumer￿ s
surplus are not large enough to compensate for the loss in worker￿ s surplus
at home.
While outsourcing may result in lower welfare, it remains true that, given
that outsourcing takes place, a lower W f always increases welfare.
Proposition 3:Given that outsourcing takes place and there is no ￿xed
















dW f < 0
4 Outsourcing with homogeneous ￿xed costs
Now suppose that outsourcing involves a ￿xed cost F(z) > 0 for ￿rm z.
In this section, we assume F(z) = F for all z 2 [0;1]. In a later section,
we will allow for heterogeneity in F(z) across ￿rms. A ￿rm will choose to
outsource only if the gain in gross pro￿t (relative to keeping production in
H) is su¢ cient to compensate for the ￿xed cost of outsourcing that must be
incurred.
4.1 Equilibrium pro￿t under outsourcing
Suppose that only a fraction ￿ of ￿rms outsource. Suppose the wage in Home
is rigid and ￿xed at some level W h(for example, W h = W, the equilibrium
wage before outsourcing takes place). Foreign wage is W f < W h. The price
of the varieties produced at home is ph = ￿W h and the price of the varieties













(1 ￿ ￿)(￿W h)1￿￿ + ￿(￿W f)1￿￿￿
.Clearly, the price index P(￿;W f;W h)















The equilibrium output of a home-produced variety is qh = (￿W h)￿￿P ￿￿￿,while















Given the outsourcing fraction ￿, the gain in gross pro￿t by an outsourcing


















Clearly g(￿) is a decreasing function of ￿.
Suppose there exists a number ￿















then in equilibrium, ￿
￿ is the fraction of the industry that chooses to out-
source. At the price P(￿
￿;W f;W h), any individual ￿rm is indi⁄erent between
remaining in the Home country, and re-locating to the low-wage economy.
The RHS of equation (7) is a positive and decreasing function of ￿ and the
LHS is a positive constant.If F is neither too large nor too small, the equation
(7) will identify a unique ￿
￿ 2 (0;1) which is the equilibrium fraction of the
industry that choose to outsource. We now determine exactly the range
(FL;FH) that F must belong to in order to generate an equilibrium with















= g(1) < g(￿)
If the ￿xed cost F of outsourcing is lower than FL, every ￿rm will ￿nd that
outsourcing is better than keeping production in H, regardless of how many















= g(0) > g(￿)
With F > FH, every ￿rm will ￿nd that outsourcing is inferior to keeping
production in H, regardless of how many ￿rms it thinks will outsource. Note
that the upper and lower threshold levels FL and FH are functions of the
parameters (W h;W f).
Example 4.1: upper and lower threshold levels of ￿xed cost
Assume nL = 1=(2
p
2), ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 1
3: Assume the wage rate at home
is W h = 1 and W f = 0:7: When every ￿rm chooses to outsource, i.e. ￿ = 1;
the price index will only includes foreign prices and P￿=1 = ￿W f = 1:4:
Similarly, when every ￿rm chooses keep production at home, i.e. ￿ = 0; the
price index only include home prices and P￿=0 = ￿W h = 2: Then, the upper
and lower threshold levels of ￿xed cost that generate an equilibrium with
fractional outsourcing of the industry are FL = 0:12677 and FH = 0:15152.
Therefore, when 0:12677 < F < 0:15152; a positive fraction of ￿rm will
choose to relocate to the foreign country where cheap labour is available.
For example, when F = 0:14; ￿
￿ = 0:4. As the foreign wage rate falls, both
threshold levels of ￿xed cost increase and the gap between them widens. For
example, when W f = 0:5; FL = 0:25 and FH = 0:35355:
Is it possible that the net pro￿t under outsourcing is smaller than the net
pro￿t when outsourcing is not an available option? The answer is yes.
Proposition 4: If the ￿xed cost F of outsourcing is within the range
(FL;FH), in equilibrium only a fraction ￿
￿ 2 (0;1) will outsource. The out-
sourcing ￿rms and the non-outsourcing ￿rms earn the same pro￿t in equilib-
rium. This pro￿t may be lower than what ￿rms earn when outsourcing is not
available. It is de￿nitely lower, if W h = W.
Proof: Suppose W h = W, and assume that F 2 (FL;FH). Then a
16positive fraction ￿ of the industry will outsource, and the remaining fraction,
1￿￿, will keep production at home. Since no individual ￿rm has any in￿ uence
on industry price and output, and ￿rms do not di⁄er in cost characteristics,
at the equilibrium, the net pro￿t of an outsourcing ￿rm is equal to that of
a non-outsourcing ￿rm. Now, since the price index P falls (relative to the
closed economy level) with outsourcing, while ph remains at ￿W, the demand
qh and is now lower, and the pro￿t ￿h is also lower (as compared with the
closed economy case), see eq (6). From this result, and the fact that at the
outsourcing equilibrium with ￿ 2 (0;1), all ￿rms earn the same pro￿t level,
irrespective of their outsourcing status, it follows that all ￿rms earn less pro￿t
when a fraction of the industry outsource in equilibrium. By continuity, if
W h is marginally lower than W, outsourcing can reduce the pro￿ts of all
￿rms.
Example 4.2: reduced pro￿t under complete outsourcing
Assume nL = 1=(2
p
2), ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 1
3: Assume that both before and
after outsourcing, the home wage is ￿xed at W = 1: In the closed economy,
















Suppose now outsourcing is available at some wage W f < 1. Suppose
that the ￿xed cost is FL so that every ￿rm ￿nds that outsourcing is better
than keeping production at H, regardless of how many ￿rms it believes to

















The net pro￿t from outsourcing is
b ￿
net












17Clearly, since Wf <
p
W f when W f < 1, the following inequality holds:
b ￿
net
out < b ￿closed. It follows that, given F = FL, the net pro￿t from outsourcing
is smaller than the pro￿t that each ￿rm makes when outsourcing is not
available.
Corollary 4: If W h = W; and fractional outsourcing takes place (i.e.,
￿ 2 (0;1)), then employment in H will fall.
Proof: Since qh falls relative to the output of the representative ￿rm in
the closed economy case, the total employment in H falls from nL to ￿qh.
Remark 4.1: Let us consider a given F > 0. At the initial closed
economy equilibrium, the output is Q ￿ nL, the price is P = (nL)￿1=￿, and
the wage rate is W = P=￿. If W f is just marginally lower than W, there
will be no outsourcing, because the saving in variable cost is not su¢ cient to
outweight the ￿xed cost of outsourcing. Outsourcing begins only when W f


























Further falls in W f will lead to a positive ￿. If W h remains ￿xed at W due to
institutional wage rigidity, the employment level in H will fall, as described
in Corollary 4 above.
Example 4.3: Critical level of foreign wage, given ￿xed cost of
outsourcing
Assume the parameters take the same values as in Example 3.1, except
now there is a ￿xed cost of outsourcing, F = 0:3: Given this ￿xed cost, ￿rms













Thus W fc = 0:54097.As the ￿xed cost becomes larger, say F = 1:0; this
critical level of foreign wage falls to W fc = 0:2612: The fall in foreign wage
is necessary to compensate for a large cost of relocating production facilities.
Remark 4.2: (On the simultaneous determination of the extent
of outsourcing and post-outsourcing domestic wage).
Now assume W h is ￿ exible. Then it will fall to preserve full employment
in H. In that case, we have the following two conditions that simultaneously
determine the equilibrium value of ￿ and W h, denoted by ￿
￿ and W h￿:
(1 ￿ ￿)q

















where qh = (￿W h￿)￿￿ ￿
P(￿;W f;W h￿)
￿￿￿￿.We can then compute the gains
in consumer surplus, the loss in worker￿ s surplus, the gains (or losses) in net
pro￿ts, the net welfare gains, etc., associated with a given pair (F;W f) where
W f is assumed to be below the critical threshold value W fc :
4.2 Possibility of welfare loss under outsourcing with
￿xed cost, with or without domestic wage ￿ exibil-
ity
We know that if (i) the ￿xed cost is zero, and (ii) ￿ = W f, then the socially
optimal extent of outsourcing is ￿
so = 1, and this coincides with the equilib-
rium extent of outsourcing. However, with positive ￿xed cost of outsourcing,
19it is possible to construct numerical examples where the gains from increased
consumer surplus is not enough to compensate for the reduction in pro￿ts
caused by outsourcing.
Remark 4.3: (0n consumer￿ s surplus under fractional outsourcing and




























After outsourcing, with ￿
￿ being the fraction of ￿rms that outsource, the
price level is P(￿





























Example 4.4: Welfare loss under fractional outsourcing with
￿xed cost and ￿ exible domestic wage
As before, we assume nL = 1=(2
p
2), ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 1
3: The home wage
rate before outsourcing is W = 1: The ￿xed cost of production relocation is
F = 0:3: As shown in example 4.3, the critical value of foreign wage is W fc =
0:54097: As the foreign wage falls bellow this critical level, a fraction of ￿rm
will choose to outsource their production. Assume foreign wage is W f = 0:5:
We ￿rst calculate the level of consumer￿ s surplus before outsourcing. This





























The pro￿t and worker surplus (assuming ￿ = 0) in the closed economy case
are ￿closed = 0:35355 and !closed = 0:35355. Assume the home wage rate is
￿ exible, then W h will fall bellow W to preserve full employment in home
20country. The equilibrium values ￿
￿ and W h￿ can be obtained from the sys-
tems of equation (8) and (9):
(1 ￿ ￿
￿)q








































Substitute the parameter values in the above equations and solve for equilib-
rium values, we have ￿
￿ = 0:084504 and W h￿ = 0:9215: The price level after
outsourcing is P(￿
￿;W f;W h￿) = 1:7204 and the associated consumption




￿￿￿ = 0:44316: Therefore, the CS after out-
sourcing is c CS = 1:5248.The pro￿t and worker surplus (assumming ￿ = 0) in
the fractional outsourcing case are ￿out = 0:0683 and !out = 0:32580. This
example shows a net fall in welfare (by the amount 0:2033) when oursourcing
takes place.
5 Outsourcing under heterogeneous ￿xed costs
Assume that ￿rms di⁄er with respect to ￿xed cost of outsourcing. Rank
them in the increasing order of ￿xed costs, and assume that F(0) = 0 and
F(1) = 1. We now determine the equilibrium fraction of ￿rms that choose
to outsource when ￿xed costs di⁄er across ￿rms.
5.1 Equilibrium fractional outsourcing: the pivot ￿rm
Suppose that only a fraction ￿ of ￿rms outsource. Suppose the wage in
Home is rather rigid and is ￿xed at W h.Taking into account the ￿xed cost
21of outsourcing, there is a ￿pivot ￿rm￿ , say ￿rm z￿, that is indi⁄erent between















Assume ￿ > ￿. Then the RHS of equation (11) is a positive and decreasing
function of z￿ and the LHS is increasing in z￿. Since F(z￿) is increasing in
z￿, there is a unique z￿(which depends on the ￿xed W h and W f).
Lemma 5.1 : Given (W h;W f), the equilibrium fraction of ￿rms that
choose to outsource is unique, and satis￿es equation (11).
Comparative statics: For a ￿xed W h, a decrease in W f will shift the



















































is negative, because F 0 > 0 and @P(z￿;W f;W h)=@z <





Lemma 5.2: An increase in W f will reduce z￿.
Suppose the wage in H is ￿xed at W h. Does outsourcing decrease em-
ployment at home? After outsourcing, employment at home is
(1 ￿ z
￿)q










22The right-hand side of eq (12) is decreasing in z￿. So employment falls, if
W h is ￿xed at W. The quantity of foreign labour employed by ￿rms that
outsource abroad is Lf = z￿(￿W f)￿￿ [P(z￿)]
￿￿￿.Assume all workers prefer
being employed at wage W h to being unemployed with assistance payment
WA. Then the labour market allocates the ￿xed number of jobs at random.
5.2 Welfare under heterogeneous ￿xed costs
Social welfare consists of the utility of consuming the quantity Q (all output
are consumed at home) minus (i) the e⁄ort cost of home labour, ￿(nLu),
where nLu = (1 ￿ z￿)qh ￿ nL, and (ii) the value of all payments to foreign


















Welfare under outsourcing is

























The net gain (or loss) due to outsourcing is
b ￿ ￿ ￿ =
h















Again, this expression is ambiguous in sign. It can be negative if W f ￿￿
is su¢ ciently large.
Example 5: heterogeneous ￿xed cost and negative welfare change
Assume the same set of parameter values, i.e. ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 1
3; then ￿ = 2
and ￿ = 1:5: The home wage rate is assumed to be ￿xed at W h = W = 5;
23the foreign wage is W f = 4 and the reservation wage at home is ￿ = 0:2:
Assume the "pivot ￿rm" has the ￿xed cost of outsourcing F(z￿) = 0:0355: By







P(z￿;W h;W f￿￿￿￿ ;




= 8:0656: The price index before outsourcing is
P(0;W h;W f) = 10:Using the above quantities, we calculate the change in
welfare when outsourcing is allowed, given heterogeneous ￿xed costs of relo-
cation: b ￿ ￿ ￿ = [0:10765] ￿ f0:16419g ￿ ￿(z￿) < 0.
6 Optimal outsourcing vs equilibrium outsourc-
ing
Suppose the government can in￿ uence the fraction of ￿rms that outsource,
e.g., by subsidizing the ￿xed costs of outsourcing. What is the optimal z?
This depends on whether W h is ￿xed (which implies an increase in unem-
ployment when there is an increase in outsourcing), or W h is ￿ exible (so that
full employment is maintained at home). Let us consider the case where the
wage rate in H is rigid. Social welfare consists of gross consumer surplus,
minus the payments of ￿xed costs (to foreigners), minus the disutility of work
of home workers.





















































24On the other hand, under laissez-faire, the equilibrium fraction of ￿rms that
































Proposition 5: In general, the equilibrium extent of outsourcing, z￿, does
not coincide with the socially optimal extent, zso. A necessary and su¢ cient
condition for the two values to coincide is that the equality (17) holds.
Since z￿ depends on the function F(:), while condition (17) does not, we
conclude that generically zso 6= z￿.
7 A two-period model
Now consider a two-period framework. Assume that any ￿rm that outsources
incurs the ￿xed cost only once. We suppose that F1 > F2. By delaying
outsourcing to the second period, a ￿rm can save on the ￿xed cost, but at
the same time, it cannot take advantage of the low wage in period 1. There
are three strategies that a ￿rm can adopt. We denote by (f;f) the strategy
of outsourcing in both periods (and thus incurring the ￿xed cost in period
1). The strategy (h;f) means producing in H in period 1, and outsourcing
in period 2. Finally, the strategy (h;h) means to keep production in H in
both periods. Consider the case where ￿rms are ex ante identical, i.e., the
￿xed cost of outsourcing is the same for all. Let Ft be the ￿xed cost that a
￿rm must pay if it begins outsourcing in period t. Let z1 denote the measure
of ￿rms that choose (f;f), z2 ￿ z1 denote the measure of ￿rms that choose
(h;f), and 1 ￿ z2 denote the measure of ￿rms that choose (h;h). Let W f
25be the wage in the foreign country, which we assume to be the same in both
periods. Let W be the ￿xed wage in H.




















The period-1 demand and period-2 demand for the output of the ￿rm that







. Similarly, q1(h;f) = (￿W)￿￿ ￿
P(z1;W f;W)
￿￿￿￿
and q2(h;f) = (￿W f)￿￿ ￿
P(z2;W f;W)
￿￿￿￿
= q2(f;f) and so on.
Let r > 0 denote the interest rate. De￿ne R = (1+r). The present value





























































All three types of ￿rms co-exist in equilibrium if and only if there are
values z￿
1 2 (0;1) and z￿
2 2 (z￿
1;1) that satisfy the following pair of equations:
V (f;f) = V (h;f) and V (f;f) = V (h;h).In this case, all ￿rms earn the same
present value of net pro￿ts, and they all make less pro￿t than in the closed
economy equilibrium. (Of course, lower pro￿ts do not necessarily mean lower
welfare; the gain in consumer￿ s surplus may dominates the fall in pro￿ts.)
26Example 7.1: Fractional outsourcing in a two period model
We assume ￿ = 2 and ￿ = 1
3. Assume the home wage rate is rigid, W = 1,
and W f = 0:5: Let F1 = 0:55. If they wait until period 2, the ￿xed cost of
outsourcing falls to F2 = 0:27. Assume a discount rate r = 0:1. It is easy to
verify that the equilibrium values are z￿
1 = 0:34771 and z￿
2 = 0:71468:
8 Concluding Remarks
We have developed a theoretical model to evaluate the e⁄ects of outsourcing
on consumer surplus, pro￿ts, worker￿ s surplus, and welfare. One of the con-
clusions is that outsourcing is not necessarily pro￿t-enhancing in equilibrium,
even though it is individually rational for each ￿rm to choose to outsource.
This is because ￿rms do not internalize the e⁄ect of their outsourcing decision
on the industry price level. With a su¢ ciently large fall in price, the bene￿ts
of the low wage in the foreign country turns out to be a curse. Another source
of welfare loss from outsourcing is the ￿trade diversion￿e⁄ect of access to the
foreign labour pool. Firms prefer foreign labour to domestic labour because
of the low foreign wage rate. However, from the perspective of social welfare
of the advanced economy, the true labour cost in the home country is not
the high wage there, but only the disutility of work. In general, outsourcing
need not be welfare improving.
We have also indicated that the extent and the speed of outsourcing
in a laissez-faire equilibrium may not be socially optimal. Under certain
conditions, a slowing down of the speed of outsourcing can improve welfare.
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